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Abstract 
This paper explains the build-up and reversal of euro area macroeconomic imbalances by 
considering the interaction between the underlying income distribution in each country and 
EMU-induced financial liberalization. The argument is that the sharp increase in money 
supply since the early 1990s had the effect of relaxing collateral constraints for illiquid lower-
income groups, whilst having no specific impact on other households. The former started 
over-borrowing against optimistic expectations about their future income. It follows that 
unequal countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain - where the share of 
lower-income groups is relatively high - had greater private debt burdens and worse external 
positions than equal countries. Consequently, current account reversal was asymmetric 
because the crisis forced these indebted households to abruptly reduce consumption not least 
because they were the first to be pulled out of the labour market and hardly had financial 
buffers. The hypothesis is tested using a difference-in-difference approach to panel data. 
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Income Inequality and Macroeconomic 
Imbalances under EMU  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The period following the introduction of the Euro left the euro area divided 
into a periphery with uncontrolled fiscal deficit and debt dynamics, highly 
leveraged households and firms, fragile banking systems and strong wage 
and price growth; and on the other hand, a core with conservative public 
finances, modest private debt indebtedness, relatively stable banking systems 
and moderate wage and price growth. This dichotomy was well reflected in 
macroeconomic imbalances, which are sensitive to changes in quantities as 
well as in prices. Peripheral countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
and to a lesser extent Italy have been suffering from current account deficits 
since the introduction of the single currency and up to around 2011, after 
which these started reversing. On the other hand, core countries especially 
Austria, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands benefited from sustained 
surpluses that but did not go through a symmetric adjustment. 
 
This paper aims to identify a common explanation for both the build-up and 
the asymmetric reversal of macroeconomic imbalances. The focus is on factors 
driving credit demand and in turn household debt leverage. The immediate 
reference literature is the one according to which credit demand in the 
periphery was driven by a standard catching up story, with low-income 
countries getting indebted for inter-temporal consumption purposes 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002; Fagan and Gaspar 2007, 2008). However, 
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compared with this literature, we depart from a representative-agent 
framework and account for the fact that household indebtedness is likely to 
vary along the income distribution, being concentrated at the bottom of the 
distribution especially in unequal countries, as supported by the empirical 
evidence (HFCN 2013; Lebartz 2014). We also relate to the literature that has 
found a positive association between inequality and current account deficits 
(Kumhof et al 2012).  
 
The argument developed in this paper is that peripheral countries imported 
large amounts of capital from abroad, hence their current account deficits, 
because they were relatively unequal societies, with a large cohort of lower-
income groups that experienced a sudden relaxation of their collateral 
constraints following financial integration in the early 1990s.1 The same is not 
true for relatively equal countries where prior to EMU collateral constraints 
had not been as biting, and if, only for a smaller share of the population. The 
hypothesis is tested with a difference-in-difference approach to panel data so 
as to isolate a causal relation between EMU-induced financial liberalization 
from around 1995 and imbalances in unequal euro area countries compared 
with a group of similarly unequal countries that did not go through the same 
financial shock.  
 
The debate on the origins of euro area imbalances and the mechanism 
through which they have been unwinding in the periphery and not in the core 
is not fully settled. There remains fundamental disagreement over their 
origins, which obviously affects the interpretation of their reversal. Some 
support the competitiveness hypothesis, according to which imbalances relate 
to differences in cost competitiveness between the core and the periphery that 
                                               
1 We use the expression “lower-income” to indicate that the phenomenon concerns less wealthy groups, while not necessarily the bottom quintile of the income distribution. 
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have come to light following the loss of the exchange rate as a policy 
instrument (Zemanek, Belke and Schnabel 2009; Belke and Dreger 2011). 
Others maintain the capital-flow hypothesis. As in accounting terms a current 
account deficit consists of a shortage in domestic saving that is being satisfied 
by foreign capital, deficit countries are described as net recipients of capital 
inflows, with investors in the core after the greatest possible return, which is 
typically highest in the low-capital-stock countries of Southern Europe, and 
households in the periphery ready to borrow in the expectation of higher 
future income (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002; Fagan and Gaspar 2007, 2008; 
Abiad et al 2009; Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010; Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboom 
2010; Schmitz and Von Hagen 2011; Lane and Pels 2012).  
 
Both hypotheses have limits. The competitiveness hypothesis does not 
account for the decoupling of export performance and standard cost 
competitiveness indicators (e.g. unit labour costs or real effective exchange 
rates deflated by unit labour costs) (Gaulier and Vicard 2012). Moreover, it 
can hardly fit the Spanish and the Irish case, where the deterioration of the 
current account balance in the mid-1990s went hand in hand with an 
improvement of real effective exchange rates. There is also evidence that, in 
the periphery, causation goes from capital flows to rising real effective 
exchange rates, namely that the deterioration in cost competitiveness did not 
precede but followed the emergence of current account deficits (Gabrisch and 
Staehr 2014). Finally, the account is not consistent with the fact that current 
account reversal in deficit countries was mainly achieved through a 
contraction in demand (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2011) rather than preceded 
by an improvement in real effective exchange rates.  
 
The capital-flow hypothesis is a good starting point to understand why 
capital has been moving out of the core and into the periphery. Some focus on 
Income Inequality and Macroeconomic Imbalances under EMU 
 
4 
push factors mostly looking at the triggers of credit supply by core countries 
such as the expected rate of return (Abiad et al 2009; Giavazzi and Spaventa 
2010; Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboom 2010; Schmitz and Von Hagen 2011). 
Others are concerned with credit demand and support the idea that catching-
up countries in the euro area periphery borrowed from abroad against 
optimistic expectations about their future growth (Blanchard and Giavazzi 
2002; Fagan and Gaspar 2007, 2008; Schmitz and Von Hagen 2011; Lane and 
Pels 2012). Yet, these studies treat countries like homogenous blocks and fail 
to recognize the role of heterogeneity of households in each country. So, for 
example, there is evidence that the propensity to get indebted varies along the 
income distribution, with household debt leverage generally concentrated at 
the bottom of the income distribution, especially in unequal countries (HFCN 
2013; Lebartz 2014).2 This seems like an important dimension in light of the 
fact that the macroeconomic consequences of household indebtedness would 
fundamentally depend upon who holds debt (Eggertsson and Krugman 
2012). 
 
This paper builds on the credit-demand version of the capital-flow hypothesis 
but extends it by accounting for heterogeneity and, more precisely, for how 
the country-specific shape of the income distribution affected current account 
balances. It is argued that EMU is associated with the build-up of sizeable 
macroeconomic imbalances because financial liberalization taking place in the 
early 1990s had the effect of inducing a relaxation of collateral constraints for 
categories of households that had been until then excluded from credit, i.e. 
mostly lower-income groups. It follows that unequal countries - where the 
share of the lower-income credit-constrained group was high to start with - 
were bound to get more indebted to the outside than relatively equal 
                                               
2 The Household Finance and Consumption Network (HFCN) provides ccomparable cross-country information on the distribution of debt-to-income or debt-to-asset for the year 2010. 
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countries. The same perspective is useful to understand the reversal of 
current account deficits, as the crisis and the ensuing credit constraints forced 
deleveraging onto the same portion of the population that got indebted in the 
first place and that had no alternative but to restrain consumption 
considering that lower-income/skill workers were the first to be pulled out of 
the labour market and hardly had financial buffers.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature 
on euro area macroeconomic imbalances. Section 3 presents suggestive 
empirical evidence. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy and the results, 
while also looking at the dynamics of reversal. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Review of the literature  
 
There is a growing literature looking at the reasons behind the build-up of 
macroeconomic imbalances in Europe as well as globally. As divergences in 
Europe became both significant and persistent starting with the 1990s, the 
general consensus is that the monetary union itself played a role in this 
dynamics. In a nutshell, two alternative explanations are provided to account 
for the extraordinary accumulation of imbalances in coincidence with the 
beginning of EMU.3 One of them associates the monetary union with the loss 
of the exchange rate and states that current account deficits in the periphery 
and current account surpluses in the core reflect differences in price and cost 
competitiveness. The other explanation focuses on capital mobility, with 
                                               
3 We avoid providing a theoretical account of sources of macroeconomic imbalances that are likely to be unrelated to European monetary unification (e.g. twin-deficits hypothesis, demographics, etc.), but we include them as control variables in the econometric exercise that follows.  
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capital flowing out of the core in search for high returns and into the 
periphery where the expectation of higher future income created the 
perception that debts could be easily paid back. 
 
2.1. The competitiveness hypothesis 
 
Supporters of the competitiveness hypothesis argue that the loss of the 
exchange rate as a policy instrument brought to light fundamental cross-
country differences in price and cost competitiveness. Countries in the core 
were competitive already before the single currency was introduced: they had 
for example hard currency regimes, which reflected the fact that they did not 
need to use the exchange rate for external adjustment. On the other hand, 
countries in the periphery relied extensively on devaluation to recoup 
competitiveness and are found to have suffered from the loss of the exchange 
rate as a policy instrument. This is reflected in the strong statistical 
relationship that the literature finds between real exchange rates and current 
account balances (Zemanek, Belke and Schnabel 2009; Belke and Dreger 2011). 
 
The competitiveness hypothesis has been criticised on a number of fronts. For 
example, Gros (2011) and Gaulier and Vicard (2012) suggests that unit labour 
costs (ULC) are in fact poor predictors of exports. Gabrisch and Staehr (2014) 
show convincingly that rising ULC follow from capital inflows rather than 
being the cause of current account deficits in peripheral member states. More 
specifically, the competitiveness hypothesis is unable to account for the 
Spanish and the Irish performance, whose cost competitiveness in the early 
1990s improved on the back of a deteriorating current account balance (Figure 
1). Finally, existing evidence shows that the reversal of current account 
deficits was mainly driven by a dramatic drop in domestic demand (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti 2011), rather than being preceded by a fall in relative prices 
                                                                                                    Benedicta Marzinotto 
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which fails to confirm that macroeconomic imbalances solely reflect, possibly 
with a lag, cross-country differences in cost competitiveness. 
 
Figure 1: Current accounts and ULC-based REER, 1995-2007, EA 
 Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO Database. The sample includes all countries that participated in the first wave of EMU plus Greece. 
 
2.2. The capital-flow hypothesis 
 
An alternative way of looking at macroeconomic imbalances is to consider 
them as mirroring capital flows. Under this framework, deficit countries are 
importers of capital, while surplus countries are net exporters. The argument 
there is as follows: the opening up of the capital account together with the 
elimination of exchange rate risks made it possible for capital to move freely 
across the union, with the result that capital flew from high-income countries, 
where the return to investment is lowest because of decreasing returns to 
scale, to low-income countries, where return is instead highest. This is 
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described as a standard downhill flow of capital, a process that is fully driven 
by market dynamics and that would allow low-income countries to catch up 
with the rest of the union (Abiad et al 2009; Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010; 
Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboom 2010; Schmitz and Von Hagen 2012). 
 
While the “downhill flow of capital” story focuses on credit supply, the 
symmetric argument on the credit demand side is that low-income countries 
that join an integrated economic area would borrow from outside to finance 
consumption in the expectation that they will be able to pay their debt in the 
future. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) and Fagan and Gaspar (2007, 2008) 
have explained private debt accumulation and current account deficits in the 
South of Europe by alluding to the fact that low-income countries would tend 
to engage in inter-temporal consumption. . Schmitz and Von Hagen (2012) 
confirm that differences in per capita income are the main drivers of the 
imbalances. Lane and Pels (2012) show that growth expectations of consumers 
in the periphery played a key role, whilst but being over-optimistic. The end-
result is the same found in studies looking at credit supply: capital is flowing 
from the high-income core to the low-income periphery of the euro area. 
 
Whether it is credit supply or demand that is at the centre of the analysis, the 
common point is nonetheless that macroeconomic imbalances originate in the 
capital account with the main shock coming from financial liberalization 
rather than from the loss of the exchange rate. This general hypothesis is but 
incomplete or not fully satisfactory in a number of respects. Firstly, the 
evidence indicates that low-income countries have been importing capital, 
arguably for inter-temporal consumption purposes, also before capital 
controls were fully in the early 1990s.4 Secondly, the credit-demand version 
                                               
4 For a discussion of the evidence see Section 3. 
                                                                                                    Benedicta Marzinotto 
            
9 
fails to explain why countries with similar relative income levels had different 
external positions. Thirdly, and most importantly given the angle of the 
present paper, ,the capital-flow hypothesis is not sufficiently concerned with 
the role of heterogeneity in each country, especially with the fact that the 
propensity to borrow tends to vary along the income distribution. The 
question of who holds the debt is important because it affects the 
macroeconomic effects of deleveraging. While building on the idea that 
financial liberalization is the main trigger of imbalances as in the capital-flow 
hypothesis, we look more closely into country-level structural features. 
 
2.3. The capital-flow hypothesis revisited 
 
The mere opening up of credit markets is insufficient to explain the entire 
debt cycle in the euro area periphery going from accumulation to abrupt 
deleveraging, being not apt, for example, to account for within-country 
heterogeneity. We argue, in line with the capital-flow hypothesis, that 
financial liberalization is a necessary condition for explaining divergence in 
the euro area but we add that it is per se not a sufficient explanation of 
imbalances. Our argument is that the country-specific distribution of income - 
which is the outcome of countries’ institutional set-ups – does indeed play a 
role, with unequal countries of the euro area more likely to borrow from the 
outside than equal ones in the face of financial liberalization. 
 
The link between income inequality and external positions has been explored 
before. Kumhof et al (2012) show that idiosyncratic shocks to income 
distribution induce affected groups to borrow from others both domestically 
and internationally in order to smooth consumption. The need for well-
developed credit markets would thus arise endogenously. Against this 
Income Inequality and Macroeconomic Imbalances under EMU 
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background, top earners are likely to act as intermediaries of foreign capital, 
which further increases their share of domestic income.5 This generates the 
evidence that unequal countries tend to have relatively poor external 
positions. 
 
Differently from existing analyses, credit supply is here an exogenous shock 
associated with EMU rather than stemming endogenously from the fact that 
poor households demand insurance via credit markets. We argue that 
financial openness during the early 1990s led to strong consumption in 
unequal countries of the euro area because it was associated with a relaxation 
of collateral constraints for the large cohort of lower-income groups that 
populated these countries. The argument is supported by evidence according 
to which, in unequal countries, debt leverage tends be concentrated at the 
bottom of the income distribution (HFCN 2013; Lebartz 2014). This 
perspective would, among others, explain a large current account deficit in a 
relatively competitive yet unequal country such as Ireland. The question of 
who holds debt is important because it can shed light on the macroeconomic 
effects of deleveraging, as shown in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). 
Moreover, our framework helps interpreting the evidence that the correction 
of current account deficits was mainly achieved via abrupt demand 
compression. The tentative explanation is indeed that indebted lower-
income/skill groups had no alternative but to compress consumption 
considering that they were first to be pulled out of the labour market and at 
the same time had no financial buffers. This generated a standard debt cycle 
going from boom to bust in the unequal periphery, yet not necessarily in the 
                                               
5 It should be noted that this is more likely to happen if foreign capital takes the form of inter- or intra-bank loans as opposed to portfolio or foreign direct investment considering that the latter two may not necessarily require intermediaries. 
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core of the monetary union, where EMU did not come as a credit shock as 
much as it did in the former group of countries. 
 
 
3. Empirical motivation 
 
The argument that households in low-income countries get indebted to the 
outside in the expectation of higher income tomorrow is well supported by 
the empirical literature that finds that relative per capita income is an 
important medium-term explanatory variable of current account balances 
(Debelle and Faruqee 1996; Chinn and Prasad 2003; Abiad et al 2009; Jaumotte 
and Sodsriwiboom 2010; Schmitz and Von Hagen 2011). This line of reasoning 
is for example at the core of the capital-flow hypothesis described above. 
 
However, per capita income is incapable of explaining, for example, why 
countries with comparable per capita income level have been importing 
different amounts of foreign capital. More to the point, the evidence shows 
that the catching up of the periphery has been a standing feature of the EU 
since the 1980s, hence including the period before full capital mobility. Figure 
2 sketches the relationship between per capita income relative to the US 
expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) and the current account balance 
as a proportion of GDP over 1980-2007. The sample includes all countries that 
entered EMU in the first wave plus Greece over 1980-2007 distinguishing 
between two sub-periods, 1980-1994 (Figure 2a) and 1995-2007 (Figure 2b). 
We choose the year 1995 to isolate the beginning of full capital mobility, as 
this is the average time around which the capital account is significantly 
liberalised for most  prospective EMU members, as recorded by the so-called 
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ChinnCIto!index.6!The!data!indicate!that!relatively!lowCincome!countries!tend!
to!have!worse!external!positions!than!highCincome!countries,!whether!capital!
markets!are!partially!liberalized!as!in!the!period!1980C1994!(Figure!2a)!or!fully!
liberalized! as! in! 1995C2007! (Figure! 2b).! That! lowCincome! countries! import!
capital!possibly!to!engage!in!interCtemporal!consumption!thus!predates!EMU.!
!
Figure!2:!Relative!income!and!current!account!balances!198042007,!EA!
(a)!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !(b)!
!Source:!Own$elaboration$based$on$AMECO$Database$and$Penn$World$Tables.$The$sample$includes$all$countries$that$participated$in$the$first$wave$of$EMU$(AT,$BE,$FI,$FR,$DE,$IE,$IT,$LU,$NL,$PT,$ES)$plus$Greece.$
!
By! contrast,! a! time! break! characterises! the! relationship! between! income!
inequality!and!current!account!positions.!Figure!3!displays! the! link!between!
the! standardized! Gini! coefficient! and! the! current! account! balance! as! a!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!
6$The$ChinnOIto$ index$ is$ a$de#jure$measure$of$ financial$ openness$ as$ captured$by$ the$number$of$restrictions$ on$ crossOborder$ financial$ transactions$ as$ reported$ in$ the$ IMF’s$ Annual$ Report$ on$Exchange$Rate$Arrangements$and$Exchange$Restrictions.$Greater$values$indicate$that$a$country$is$more$open$to$crossOborder$financial$transactions$(Chinn$and$Ito$2006).$
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proportion! of! GDP! over! 1980C2007.7 !The! sample! is! the! same! used! in! the!
previous! figure! and! the! beginning! of! financial! liberalization! is! again! set! in!
1995.!In!this!case,!it!does!matter!whether!capital!markets!are!partially!(Figure!
3a)! or! fully! liberalized! (Figure! 3b).! Prior! to! full! capital!mobility,! there! is! no!
relation!between!the!distribution!of!income!and!the!external!balance.!Yet,!this!
becomes!significant!and!negatively!signed!following!the!opening!up!of!capital!
accounts! as! of! 1995,! with! high! inequality! associated! with! worse! current!
account! balances.! The! evidence! is! suggestive! of! a! “special”! interaction!
between! financial! deregulation,! the! shape! of! the! income! distribution! and!
current!account!balances.!
!
Figure!3:!Income!inequality!and!current!account!balances!198042007,!EA!
(a)!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! (b)!
$Source:!Own$ elaboration$ based$ on$ AMECO$ Database$ and$ Standardised$World$ Income$Inequality$Database.$The$sample$includes$all$countries$that$participated$in$the$first$wave$of$EMU$(AT,$BE,$FI,$FR,$DE,$IE,$IT,$LU,$NL,$PT,$ES)$plus$Greece.$
!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!
7$The$Gini$coefficient$is$the$most$standard$measure$of$income$inequality.$It$captures$the$distance$in$income$between$two$random$income$groups$in$the$population.$The$indicator$is$standardised$so$as$to$allow$crossOcountry$comparability$(Solt$2009).$$
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Figure 4: Debt and net financial assets to income ratios, 1995-2011 
 Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat. The sample includes all countries that participated in the first wave of EMU (AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES) plus Greece. 
 
Aggregate private indebtedness (and current account imbalances) is 
explained, in our framework, by the share of lower-income credit-constrained 
households. Moreover, to the extent that lower-income groups were more 
likely to lose their job in the crisis and hardly had financial buffers, the same 
perspective is useful to explain the abrupt deleveraging process in the 
periphery. Figure 4a compares the mean debt-to-income ratios in the 
periphery with that of the core. 8  While household indebtedness was on 
average higher in core countries for most part of the 1990s, with the 
Netherlands in particular driving the results, it rose significantly in Southern 
European countries starting from the early 1990s, eventually overshooting the 
mean debt leverage in the core as of 2003. The phenomenon went hand in 
                                               
8 The debt to income ratio is defined as debt arising from loans, recorded at the end of each calendar year, to the gross disposable income of the same year (Eurostat). 
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hand with an erosion of the net financial assets to income ratio in the 
periphery as opposed to the core, as shown in Figure 4b,9 that explains why 
households were found unprepared to withstand the large crisis shock. 
 
 
4. Empirical strategy and results 
 
The hypothesis we put to the test is that EMU exercised a causal effect on 
macroeconomic imbalances, leading to a deterioration of the external balance 
of unequal countries as here a majority of the population had been credit-
constrained prior to financial liberalization. The same would not be true for 
relatively equal countries. 
 
4.1. The impact of EMU on imbalances 
 
We adopt a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach with the aim of showing 
that EMU had a causal effect on macroeconomic imbalances given initial 
conditions pertaining to the income distribution. The sample brings together 
all OECD countries whose inequality record over 1980-2007 was above the 
median of the overall OECD sample, whether inequality is measured by the 
standardised Gini coefficient or the income share of the top 1 percent. The 
group of unequal countries selected in this way comprises 12 OECD 
countries, namely Australia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA. The treatment group is 
represented by countries that join the single currency and the year of 
treatment is identified as being 1995, which is the average time around which 
                                               
9 The net financial assets to income ratio is defined as total financial assets minus liabilities at the end of each calendar year to the gross disposable income of the same year (Eurostat). 
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the capital account is significantly liberalised for most prospective EMU 
members, as recorded by the Chinn and Ito index. Hence, one group is 
exposed to treatment in the second period, from 1995 to 2007, but not in the 
first period from 1980 to 1994. The second group is not exposed to the 
treatment during either period.10  
 
The specification is as follows:  
 
                                                  (1) 
 
where CA is the current account balance as a share of GDP in country i and 
period t; E and d capture the treatment group and the second period 
respectively; E*d is the difference-in-difference estimator; X is  the current 
account norm, which consists of  the current account level that should prevail 
on the basis of fundamentals;11 E*d*W is a triple interaction term that includes 
the difference-in-difference estimator and a continuous measure of inequality, 
whether it is the standardised Gini coefficient or the income share of the top 1 
percent; ε is the error term. The panel is estimated using feasible generalized 
least squares (GLS) with heteroskedastic error structure, which is confirmed 
by the diagnostics, and no cross-sectional correlation.   
 
The inclusion of the current account norm comes with some advantages. First, 
it allows us to opt for a static specification circumventing the fact that current 
                                               
10 Figure A in the Appendix shows that the early 1990s come with a significant increase in financial liberalization for the euro area, but not necessarily for the countries of the world we use as control group, where financial deregulation is mostly a phenomenon of the 1980s. 11 The current account norm is extracted from a panel regression of current account balances on factors including the oil balance, the fiscal policy stance relative to trading partners, the old-age dependency ratio, real GDP per capita growth, the relative income per capital level and net foreign assets as a percentage of GDP, with all variables calculated as 4-year non-overlapping averages. The methodology is taken from Salto and Turrini (2010). See also list of variables in the appendix. 
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accounts tend to be exposed to mean reversion. Second, it contributes to 
controlling for cross-country heterogeneity and to reduce variance in the data. 
On the other hand, the triple interaction term is there to capture whether high 
inequality levels are associated with a deterioration of the current account 
away from equilibrium that is more severe than in the case of low inequality 
levels.  
 
Table 1: The impact of EMU on current account balances, OECD, 1980-2007   (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Treat -0.317 3.057*** -19.13*** -6.972**  [-0.651] [6.165] [-4.709] [-2.560] Post -1.085*** 0.637* -5.261*** 2.381**  [-3.660] [1.866] [-2.811] [2.235] Diff-in-diff -1.254* -3.044*** 15.20* 16.00***  [-1.818] [-4.860] [1.808] [3.103] Gini coefficient   -0.0739*     [-1.948]  Treat × Gini coefficient   0.707***     [5.481]  Post × Gini coefficient   0.171***     [3.257]  Diff-in-diff × Gini coefficient   -0.582**     [-2.276]  CA Norm  1.100*** 1.144*** 1.128***   [11.03] [11.60] [11.58] Top 1 percent    0.0121     [0.165] Treat × Top 1 per cent    1.294***     [3.764] Post × Top 1 per cent    -0.169*     [-1.807] Diff-in-diff × Top 1 per cent    -2.327***     [-3.953] Constant -1.823*** -2.197*** 0.214 -2.231***  [-8.700] [-8.754] [0.166] [-3.006] Observations 384 344 341 341 Number of countries 12 12 12 12 z-statistics in brackets     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     Estimation method: feasible generalised least squares (GLS) allowing for heteroskedastic error structure with no cross-sectional correlation. Sample: Australia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA.  
Table 1 presents the results. Model (1) simply tests whether EMU had any 
impact on current accounts, while Model (2) adds the current account norm, 
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allowing for a better goodness of fit. The difference-in-difference estimator is 
significant across both models, thereby confirming that EMU-induced 
financial liberalization deteriorated current account positions in unequal 
countries that joined the monetary union relatively to unequal countries that 
did not join. In Model (3) we interact the difference-in-difference estimator 
with the standardised Gini coefficient and obtain that EMU caused current 
account deterioration in rising levels of inequality. Model (4) substitutes the 
Gini coefficient with an alternative measure of inequality, namely the share of 
the top 1 per cent of the income distribution. The results confirm that, 
following financial liberalization in Europe, unequal euro area countries 
suffered from current account deterioration more than they would have if 
financial liberalization had not taken place, independently of how inequality 
is being measured.  
4.2. The impact of EMU on imbalances depending on financial 
regime 
 
To the extent that lower-income groups finally get access to credit, the early 
1990s should be associated with a significant rise in credit demand in unequal 
countries and much less so in relatively equal countries. Access to credit is 
typically proxied by private credit to GDP. The measure is but endogenous 
and any estimation that includes private debt as a simple covariate would 
produce biased results. To overcome this problem, we use a measure of access 
to credit that is likely to be exogenous, namely a de jure measure of financial 
liberalization. In fact, we use two: the so-called Chinn-Ito index, which is a de 
jure measure of financial openness as captured by the number of restrictions 
on cross-border financial transactions as reported in the IMF’s Annual Report 
on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (Chinn and Ito 
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2006) and an indicator for credit market regulation compiled by the Fraser 
Institute. Accounting for differences in de jure financial openness and credit 
regulation would allow to capture the relevance of EMU’s supply shock 
across groups of countries.   
 
Figure 5: Capital account openness and credit market regulations 1980-2011 
 Source: Own elaboration based on Chinn and Ito (2006) and Fraser Institute. Unequal euro area countries = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Equal euro area countries = Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands. 
 
Figure 5(a) shows average capital account openness in unequal (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal) versus equal countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands) over 1980-2011. Greater values 
indicate that a country is more open to cross-border financial transactions. In 
the early 1990s, when phase I of EMU kicked in, equal countries were 
relatively open financial systems so that in fact the regime change of the early 
1990s was less significant for them than for unequal countries. Figure 5(b) 
displays differences in credit market regulations over the same period. The 
indicator accounts for private versus government ownership of banks, 
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government borrowing compared with private borrowing, interest rate 
controls and the magnitude of negative real interest rates if present. Greater 
values signify less regulation. As in the case of capital account openness, 
equal countries had on average looser credit market regulation than countries 
of the periphery. The evidence on trends in credit market regulation 
underpins the argument that, when financial liberalization took place in the 
early 1990s, some countries enjoyed easier access to credit not only through 
foreign markets but also through a less regulated domestic market, with 
domestic banking systems contributing to credit bubbles by providing 
additional credit to the private sector (see for example Lane and McQuade 
2014.) 
 
In order to test whether renewed access to credit played indeed an important 
role in explaining why unequal euro area countries got indebted and 
relatively equal ones much less so, we estimate the equation below on the 
sample of all countries that accessed the euro area in the first wave plus 
Greece over the period 1980-2007:  
 
                                                    
                                                                                           (2) 
 
where CA is the current account balance as a share of GDP;    is the current 
account norm described as above; KA is an index for capital account openness 
(Chinn and Ito 2008); KA * Unequal and KA * Equal are interactions between 
capital account openness and a dummy for unequal and one for equal 
countries respectively; KA * Unequal * EMU and KA * Equal * EMU interact 
capital account openness, a dummy for each country grouping and a time 
dummy for the EMU period so as to capture whether EMU or rather EMU-
induced financial deregulation made a difference. The same estimation is run 
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substituting capital account openness with a measure for credit market 
regulation for a comprehensive assessment of credit conditions in each 
country.12 The model is estimated using random effects to allow us focusing 
on cross-country variation. The Hausman test confirms the superiority of 
random over fixed effects.  
 
Table 2: The impact of EMU on current account balances depending on financial 
regime, EA, 1980-2007   (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 CA norm 0.474*** 0.543*** 0.416*** 0.530***  [4.214] [4.984] [2.685] [3.642] KA × Unequal -2.342*** 0.00103    [-3.188] [0.000600]   KA × Equal 5.050*** 2.084*    [5.547] [1.657]   KA × Unequal × EMU  -2.239*     [-1.912]   KA × Equal × EMU  2.971***     [5.044]   CMR × Unequal   -0.275 -0.0350    [-1.080] [-0.103] CMR × Equal   0.624** 0.110    [2.549] [0.382] CMR × Unequal × EMU    -0.267**     [-1.979] CMR × Equal × EMU    0.466***     [4.773] Constant -1.882** -1.481* -2.483 -1.765  [-2.461] [-1.649] [-1.156] [-0.786] Observations 340 340 173 173 Number of countries 11 11 11 11 Hausman test  10.26     [0.0681]   z-statistics in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Panel estimated using random effects. The sample includes all countries that participated in the first wave of EMU (AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES) plus Greece over 1980-2007. 
 
Table 2 reports the results. Model (1) confirms that capital account openness 
means a different thing for different countries. In unequal countries, namely 
countries of the periphery that had been characterized by soft-currency 
                                               
12 For a definition of variables and sources, see Appendix. 
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regimes, relative capital account openness is associated with a worse current 
account balance. Yet, in equal countries of the core, mostly belonging to the 
former DM-zone, openness goes hand in hand with an improved external 
position. That is to say that financial openness is a liability for the periphery, 
but an asset for countries of the core, where greater openness comes with an 
improved trade balance. More to the point, results from model (2) indicate 
that this outcome is driven by developments occurring in the 1990s when the 
EMU process started.  
 
As anticipated above, it is not only about access to foreign capital but also 
about the extent to which access to domestic credit is facilitated. Deregulation 
of domestic credit markets lead to worse current account balances under 
EMU only in the case of unequal countries. On the other hand, in equal 
countries, it is associated with strong external positions across all times, 
which also indicates that EMU did not represent necessarily a regime change 
for core countries as much as it was for those in the periphery.  
 
4.3. Current account reversal during the crisis  
 
The crisis was associated with a dramatic reversal of current account deficits 
in the periphery, but only a timid correction of surpluses in the core. Figure 6 
plots the evolution of the current account gap across peripheral and core 
countries over 1980-2014. The current account gap is given by the deviation of 
the actual current account balance from the current account norm, where the 
latter isolates the balance that should prevail on the basis of medium-term 
fundamentals and is calculated as earlier indicated. The current account gap 
allows us to appreciate the extent to which current accounts simply reflect 
structural features of an economic system such that they should be considered 
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“normal” or rather an exceptional and temporary deviation from equilibrium 
levels. The evidence is that the current account deficits of the euro area 
periphery after 1995 have been indeed excessive, possibly because growth 
expectations in these countries ahead of monetary integration have been over-
optimistic (see also Lane and Pels 2012). The same applies to current account 
surpluses, though the size of the deviation is much more modest. The figure 
equally shows that the periphery’s external adjustment during the crisis came 
as a correction of the excessive deficits of the pre-crisis period, but also 
included a component of greater-than-required correction after 2011. By 
contrast, surpluses went through only modest adjustment.  
 
Figure 6: Current account gaps and reversals, 1980-2014, EA 
 Key: The current account gap is calculated as the difference between the current 
account balance and the “normal” current account stemming from a current account norm. Source: Own elaboration. Unequal countries = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Equal countries = Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands. 
 
Asymmetric current account reversal is here explained by the fact that the 
crisis reverted the large credit supply shock initially associated with EMU. 
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Financial distress meant that credit constraints were back in place, thereby 
putting pressure especially on poorer indebted households, which have been 
the ones that contracted debt in the first place. The evidence from the 
Household Finance and Consumption Network is indeed that the debt 
burden measured by the median debt to income ratio was highest for the 
bottom 20 per cent of the population specifically in the case of peripheral 
countries, whilst more evenly distributed across income groups in the case of 
core countries (HFCN 2013).  
 
Figure 7: Current account balances and low skilled employment 1995-2014, EA 
Key: The low-skilled employment rate is given by the employment rate of those with pre-primary and primary education. Source: Own elaboration. Unequal countries = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Equal countries = Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands. 
 
As the ensuing recession hit lower-income/skilled workers more than others, 
their debts became unsustainable, forcing some to default, others to start a 
painful deleveraging process. Figure 7 plots the evolution of the current 
balance and of the employment rate of the lowest-skilled across the core and 
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the periphery. In the periphery, with the massive collapse of employment for 
the least skilled, which in fact represent 66 per cent of all the employed, came 
a drop in consumption that led to a significant correction in current account 
deficits. By contrast, the data do not suggest any significant correlation 
between low-skilled employment and external positions in the core. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The first decade of EMU was associated with an unprecedented rise in 
macroeconomic imbalances. Moreover, the crisis led to a correction of current 
account deficits but not to a symmetric adjustment of excessive surpluses. We 
suggested that, amongst the explanations for the build-up of imbalances, the 
so-called competitiveness hypothesis has weak support in the data. On the 
other hand, the capital-flow hypothesis is a rather more convincing analytical 
framework because it privileges capital account openness over the loss of the 
exchange rate as the main driver of the imbalances. We indeed built on the 
capital-flow hypothesis but extended it by looking at credit demand along the 
income distribution. The argument is that capital account openness relaxed 
collateral constraints especially for lower-income groups that had limited 
access to credit prior to EMU, with the result that external debt was greatest 
in unequal countries because here the share of lower-income groups is 
relatively high. In turn, the crisis forced deleveraging onto the same portion 
of the population, not least because it was the first to be pulled out of the 
labour market, which contributed to the abrupt fall in demand and to current 
account deficit correction. 
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There are of course some caveats. This paper has been mostly concerned with 
the demand side of current account imbalances. This is not to deny that 
imbalances may be driven  by supply-side factors, being the reflection of a 
country’s export performance and of the relative resilience of world market 
shares.13 While further investigation is necessary, some of our results would 
suggest that supply-side factors might be more relevant in the case of current 
account surpluses than of deficits, as evident from the fact that for example, in 
core countries, there is a positive association between financial openness and 
external positions. 
 
One other point is that in factual terms there is not necessarily a contradiction 
between the competitiveness hypothesis and ours. Relative income equality in 
the core of Europe might be just one dimension of a more competitive 
economy. So, for example, Carlin (2013) argues that the competitive 
advantage of surplus countries is that they all enjoy wage-setting regimes that 
are able to automatically deliver wage moderation because wage setters are 
large enough to internalise the consequences of their wage demands and 
because there is coordination in wage bargaining, with the export sector 
acting as a pattern- setter for all the others. At the same time, high 
centralization and coordination of wage bargaining come with greater wage 
compression and thus with more income equality (e.g. Rueda and Pontusson 
2000). In this respect, the two explanations – the one based on competitiveness 
and the one looking at income inequality -  would be complementary rather 
than substitutes. Along these lines, one could think of imbalances as the 
outcome of a fundamental institutional asymmetry resting on national 
varieties of capitalism, with EMU bringing under the same monetary 
                                               
13 It should be however noted that, empirically, having introduced in the estimations a current account norm, has allowed us to do without key determinants on the supply side such as relative prices considering that deviations of the current account balance from equilibrium levels would imply by definition that real effective exchange rates are either over- or under-valued. 
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straightjacket systems designed to deliver export-led growth with systems 
designed for demand-led growth (Hall 2012; Stockhammer 2015). Still, even if 
the insistence on the role of inequality versus competitiveness might be a bit 
stretched here, this paper’s added value remains as that of having sketched an 
analytical framework that contributes to improving understanding of the 
demand-side drivers of imbalances. 
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Appendix  
 
Variable Definition Source Current account  Current account balance (% of GDP) AMECO Net foreign assets Net foreign assets (% of GDP) AMECO Credit market regulation The indicators included in the index for credit market freedom are: (1) private versus government ownership of banks;  (2) government borrowing compared to private borrowing; and  (3) interest rate controls and the magnitude of negative real interest rates if present. 
Fraser Institute 
Capital account openness It is a de jure measure of financial openness and is measured by the number of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions as 
reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
Chinn and Ito index 
Gini coefficient  Gini coefficient  Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWII)  Top 1 per cent  Share of top 1 per cent of income distribution Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWII) Relative income Per capita income relative to the US (=100) at current prices (PPP) Penn World Tables Real GDP growth Real GDP growth rate OECD Old dependency ratio Ratio of people older than 64 to the working-age population WDI Fiscal policy stance Cyclically adjusted net lending/borrowing of general government (% of GDP) AMECO  
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Figure A: Capital account openness in EA vs the world 1980-2011 
 Source: Own elaboration based on Chinn and Ito (2006). Treatment group = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Control group = Australia, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Turkey, United States, United Kingdom. 
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